Who Do Politicians Talk To?

@inproceedings{Liaqat2020WhoDP,
  title={Who Do Politicians Talk To?},
  author={Asad Liaqat and Ali Cheema and Shandana Khan Mohmand},
  year={2020}
}
Fareed goes back and forth between tales of how close he is to all residents of his ward and how close he is to Sheikh sahib, the National Assembly member (MNA) within whose constituency his ward lies. Fareed is one of six general members in his union council (UC); twenty-one union councils comprise Sheikh sahib’s National Assembly constituency in the heart of Lahore.1 Yet Fareed claims to be one of his closest and most cherished aides: “Sheikh sahib gets reports about who is doing what in… 

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