Who Adjusts and When ? The Political Economy of Reforms

@inproceedings{Alesina2006WhoAA,
  title={Who Adjusts and When ? The Political Economy of Reforms},
  author={Alberto F. Alesina and SILVIA ARDAGNA and Francesco Trebbi},
  year={2006}
}
Why do countries delay stabilizations of large and increasing budget deficits and inflation? And what explains the timing of reforms? We use the war-of-attrition model to guide our empirical study on a vast sample of countries. We find that stabilizations are more likely to occur when times of crisis occur, when new governments take office, when governments are “strong” (that is, presidential systems and unified governments with a large majority of the party in office), and when the executive… CONTINUE READING
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