When consciousness matters: A critical review of Daniel Wegner's The illusion of conscious will

  title={When consciousness matters: A critical review of Daniel Wegner's The illusion of conscious will},
  author={Eddy A. Nahmias},
  journal={Philosophical Psychology},
  pages={527 - 541}
  • Eddy A. Nahmias
  • Published 1 December 2002
  • Psychology, Philosophy
  • Philosophical Psychology
In The illusion of conscious will , Daniel Wegner offers an exciting, informative, and potentially threatening treatise on the psychology of action. I offer several interpretations of the thesis that conscious will is an illusion. The one Wegner seems to suggest is "modular epiphenomenalism": conscious experience of will is produced by a brain system distinct from the system that produces action; it interprets our behavior but does not, as it seems to us, cause it. I argue that the evidence… 

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  • Psychology
    Behavioral and Brain Sciences
  • 2004
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    The MIT Press
  • 2018
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