When War Helps Civil–military Relations

  title={When War Helps Civil–military Relations},
  author={Varun Piplani and Caitlin Talmadge},
  journal={Journal of Conflict Resolution},
  pages={1368 - 1394}
Coups remain a widespread and consequential political phenomenon, but it remains unclear whether interstate conflict protects leaders from the risk of coups or increases this risk. We theorize that interstate conflict—especially when it is prolonged—should protect domestic regimes from military overthrow by foreclosing many of the key pathways by which elites plot and execute coups. We test this argument using event history modeling. The evidence provides support for our claim that coup risk… 
Civil-military Pathologies and Defeat in War
This article uses an original data set, the Wartime Civil-military Relations Data Set, to test arguments about the causes of victory and defeat in war. Our analysis provides strong initial support
War Makes the Regime: Regional Rebellions and Political Militarization Worldwide
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International conflict, military rule, and violent authoritarian breakdown
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  • Political Science
    International Interactions
  • 2019
ABSTRACT Why do some transitions of power from military rule occur violently while others do not? What effect, if any, does the international security environment have on how violent breakdowns of
Civil-military Pathologies and Defeat in War: Tests Using New Data
This article uses an original data set, the Wartime Civil-military Relations Data Set, to test arguments about the causes of victory and defeat in war. Our analysis provides strong initial support
International Conflict, International Security Environment, and Military Coups
ABSTRACT Why do some countries repeatedly experience military coups while others seem immune? Are countries more prone to military coups when faced with external threats? The answers to these
Pitfalls of Professionalism? Military Academies and Coup Risk
Military academies tend to be strongly linked to the professionalization of the armed forces. This explains why many countries in the world have created such institutions. The following article
Disloyalty and Logics of Fratricide in Civil War: Executions of Officers in Republican Spain, 1936-1939
Violence within armed groups in civil wars is important and understudied. Linking literatures on civil war violence and military politics, this article asks when this fratricidal violence targets
When human capital threatens the Capitol
How does aid in the form of training influence foreign militaries’ relationship to domestic politics? The United States has trained tens of thousands of officers in foreign militaries with the goals
American Policy and Proliferation of Media as Causes of a New Type of Coup after the Cold War? Evidence from Turkey
Abstract Several cases of coups d’état in the post-Cold War period suggest that, in some coup-prone countries, the classical way of taking over governments by armies may have given way to new coup
Authoritarian regimes and civil–military relations: Explaining counterbalancing in autocracies
How do autocracies structure their civil–military relations? We contend that personalist dictators are more strongly associated with counterbalancing than other authoritarian regime types.


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One of the most striking institutional differences across countries is the extent to which their militaries intervene in politics. This article examines the role of war in generating these
War and the Fate of Regimes: A Comparative Analysis.
Governments are likely to be held accountable for the success or failure of their foreign policies. Consequently, we claim that international wars can, under specified conditions, have domestically
Coup Risk, Counterbalancing, and International Conflict
Contrary to the literature on rallies-around-the-flag, this article argues that, in some circumstances, leaders may use international conflict to promote domestic divisiveness. More specifically, the
Ethnicity, Insurgency, and Civil War
An influential conventional wisdom holds that civil wars proliferated rapidly with the end of the Cold War and that the root cause of many or most of these has been ethnic and religious antagonisms.
Coup traps: why does Africa have so many coups d'état?
In Africa coup plots are by far the most common challenge to the continuity of regimes. In this paper we investigate proneness to coups by drawing on our previous work on proneness to civil war. The
Explaining Civil-Military Relations in Complex Political Environments: India and Pakistan in Comparative Perspective
This article argues that military intervention into politics can only be understood by studying both the nature of threats and of domestic political arrangements. I offer a theory of the military in
Diversion and Political Survival in Latin America
In spite of its long history among scholars of international conflict, empirical evaluations of diversionary theory have produced contrasting—even contradictory— results. We offer three reasons for
The Political Origins of African Military Coups: Ethnic Competition, Military Centrality, and the Struggle over the Postcolonial State
Military interventions are strategic in understanding “who gets what, when, and how” in postcolonial Africa. Building on past structural explanations of African coups, we examine two waves of
Armed Servants: Agency, Oversight, and Civil–Military Relations
  • C. Welch
  • Sociology
    Perspectives on Politics
  • 2005
Armed Servants: Agency, Oversight, and Civil–Military Relations. By Peter D. Feaver. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2003. 400p. $49.95 cloth, $19.95 paper. Most scholars work within
The Limits of Diversion: Rethinking Internal and External Conflict
The diversionary hypothesis offers a powerful alternative to rationalist explanations of war based on the state as a unitary actor. Most recently, it has been used to explain why democratizing states