When Does the Second-Digit Benford’s Law-Test Signal an Election Fraud?

  title={When Does the Second-Digit Benford’s Law-Test Signal an Election Fraud?},
  author={Susumu Shikano and Verena Mack},
  journal={Jahrb{\"u}cher f{\"u}r National{\"o}konomie und Statistik},
  pages={719 - 732}
Summary Detecting election fraud with a simple statistical method and minimal information makes the application of Benford’s Law quite promising for a wide range of researchers. Whilst its specific form, the Second-Digit Benford’s Law (2BL)-test, is increasingly applied to fraud suspected elections, concerns about the validity of its test results have been raised. One important caveat of this kind of research is that the 2BL-test has been applied mostly to fraud suspected elections. Therefore… 

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