When Does Approval Voting Make the 'Right Choices'?

@article{Brams2011WhenDA,
  title={When Does Approval Voting Make the 'Right Choices'?},
  author={S. Brams and D. Kilgour},
  journal={Law \& Society: Legislation eJournal},
  year={2011}
}
We assume that a voter’s judgment about a proposal depends on (i) the proposal’s probability of being right (or good or just) and (ii) the voter’s probability of making a correct judgment about its rightness (or wrongness). Initially, the state of a proposal (right or wrong), and the correctness of a voter’s judgment about it, are assumed to be independent. If the average probability that voters are correct in their judgments is greater than ½, then the proposal with the greatest probability of… Expand
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