When Does "Economic Man" Dominate Social Behavior?

  title={When Does "Economic Man" Dominate Social Behavior?},
  author={Colin Camerer and Ernst Fehr},
  pages={47 - 52}
The canonical model in economics considers people to be rational and self-regarding. However, much evidence challenges this view, raising the question of when “Economic Man” dominates the outcome of social interactions, and when bounded rationality or other-regarding preferences dominate. Here we show that strategic incentives are the key to answering this question. A minority of self-regarding individuals can trigger a “noncooperative” aggregate outcome if their behavior generates incentives… 
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