When Do Noisy Votes Reveal the Truth?

  title={When Do Noisy Votes Reveal the Truth?},
  author={Ioannis Caragiannis and Ariel D. Procaccia and Nisarg Shah},
  journal={ACM Trans. Economics and Comput.},
A well-studied approach to the design of voting rules views them as maximum likelihood estimators; given votes that are seen as noisy estimates of a true ranking of the alternatives, the rule must reconstruct the most likely true ranking. We argue that this is too stringent a requirement and instead ask: how many votes does a voting rule need to reconstruct the true ranking? We define the family of pairwise-majority consistent rules and show that for all rules in this family, the number of… CONTINUE READING
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