When Did Ownership Separate from Control? Corporate Governance in the Early Nineteenth Century

@article{Hilt2007WhenDO,
  title={When Did Ownership Separate from Control? Corporate Governance in the Early Nineteenth Century},
  author={Eric Hilt},
  journal={IO: Firm Structure},
  year={2007}
}
  • Eric Hilt
  • Published 2007
  • Business
  • IO: Firm Structure
This paper analyzes the ownership and governance of the business corporations of New York State in the 1820s. Using a new dataset collected from the manuscript records of New York's 1823 capital tax, and from the charters of the corporations, I analyze the ownership structures of the firms, and investigate the degree to which ownership was separated from control at the time. In contrast to Berle and Means's account of the development of the corporation, the results indicate that many of the… Expand
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This paper integrates elements from the theory of agency, the theory of property rights and the theory of finance to develop a theory of the ownership structure of the firm. We define the concept ofExpand
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