When Can Mediators Build Trust?

  title={When Can Mediators Build Trust?},
  author={Andrew H. Kydd},
  journal={American Political Science Review},
  pages={449 - 462}
  • Andrew H. Kydd
  • Published 1 August 2006
  • Political Science
  • American Political Science Review
Mediation is one of the most widespread techniques for preventing conflict and promoting cooperation. I examine the conditions under which mediators can facilitate cooperation by building trust between two parties. Assuming mediators have no intrinsic commitment to honesty, they can be credible trust builders in one-round interactions only if they care about the issue at stake, have a moderate ideal point, and do not find conflict to be too costly. A mediator that is solely interested in… 
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