• Corpus ID: 233024852

When Can Liquid Democracy Unveil the Truth?

@article{Becker2021WhenCL,
title={When Can Liquid Democracy Unveil the Truth?},
author={Ruben Becker and Gianlorenzo D'angelo and Esmaeil Delfaraz and Hugo Gilbert},
journal={ArXiv},
year={2021},
volume={abs/2104.01828}
}
• Published 5 April 2021
• Computer Science
• ArXiv
Liquid democracy is a voting paradigm that allows voters that are part of a social network to either vote directly or delegate their voting rights to one of their neighbors. The delegations are transitive in the sense, that a voter who decides to delegate, delegates both her own vote and the ones she has received through delegations. The additional exibility of the paradigm allows to transfer voting power towards a subset of voters ideally containing the most expert voters on the question at…
5 Citations

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References

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