What you believe versus what you think they believe: a neuroimaging study of conceptual perspective‐taking

  title={What you believe versus what you think they believe: a neuroimaging study of conceptual perspective‐taking},
  author={Perrine Ruby and Jean Decety},
  journal={European Journal of Neuroscience},
  • P. Ruby, J. Decety
  • Published 1 June 2003
  • Psychology
  • European Journal of Neuroscience
Social communication requires shared representations as well as a cognitive flexibility for successful interactions between self and other. What neural mechanisms underlie the ability to distinguish between our own perspective vs. the perspective of others at a conceptual level? In this PET study subjects who were medical students were asked according to the experimental conditions to respond to a list of health‐related questions, taking either their own perspective or the perspective of a ‘lay… 
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