What is a Computer? A Survey

  title={What is a Computer? A Survey},
  author={William J. Rapaport},
  journal={Minds and Machines},
  • W. Rapaport
  • Published 25 May 2018
  • Philosophy
  • Minds and Machines
Abstract A critical survey of some attempts to define ‘computer’, beginning with some informal ones (from reference books, and definitions due to H. Simon, A.L. Samuel, and M. Davis), then critically evaluating those of three philosophers (J.R. Searle, P.J. Hayes, and G. Piccinini), and concluding with an examination of whether the brain and the universe are computers. 
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