What is Wrong with Deductivism?

@article{Luque2020WhatIW,
  title={What is Wrong with Deductivism?},
  author={Lilian Bermejo Luque},
  journal={Informal Logic},
  year={2020}
}
In “Deductivism as an Interpretative Strategy: A Reply to Groarke’s Defense of Reconstructive Deductivism,” David Godden (2005) distinguished two notions of deductivism. On the one hand, as an interpretative thesis, deductivism is the view that all-natural language argumentation must be interpreted as being deductive. On the other hand, as an evaluative thesis, deductivism is the view that for a conclusion to follow, it has to follow of necessity from the premises—or, in other words, that being… 
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