What is ‘mental action’?

@article{Levy2019WhatI,
  title={What is ‘mental action’?},
  author={Yair Levy},
  journal={Philosophical Psychology},
  year={2019},
  volume={32},
  pages={969 - 991}
}
  • Y. Levy
  • Published 3 July 2019
  • Philosophy
  • Philosophical Psychology
ABSTRACT There has been a resurgence of interest lately within the philosophy of mind and action in the category of mental action. Against this background, the present paper aims to question the very possibility, or at least the theoretical significance, of teasing apart mental and bodily acts. After raising some doubts over the viability of various possible ways of drawing the mental-act–bodily-act distinction, the paper draws some lessons from debates over embodied cognition which, arguably… 

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