What concept analysis in philosophy of science should be (and why competing philosophical analyses of gene concepts cannot be tested by polling scientists).

@article{Waters2004WhatCA,
  title={What concept analysis in philosophy of science should be (and why competing philosophical analyses of gene concepts cannot be tested by polling scientists).},
  author={C. Kenneth Waters},
  journal={History and philosophy of the life sciences},
  year={2004},
  volume={26 1},
  pages={29-58}
}
What should philosophers of science accomplish when they analyze scientific concepts and interpret scientific knowledge? What is concept analysis if it is not a description of the way scientists actually think? I investigate these questions by using Hans Reichenbach's account of the descriptive, critical, and advisory tasks of philosophy of science to examine Karola Stotz and Paul Griffiths' idea that poll-based methodologies can test philosophical analyses of scientific concepts. Using… CONTINUE READING