What accountability pressures do MPs in Africa face and how do they respond? Evidence from Ghana*

  title={What accountability pressures do MPs in Africa face and how do they respond? Evidence from Ghana*},
  author={Staffan I. Lindberg},
  journal={The Journal of Modern African Studies},
  pages={117 - 142}
  • S. Lindberg
  • Published 10 January 2010
  • Economics
  • The Journal of Modern African Studies
ABSTRACT How African politicians, especially legislators, behave on a daily basis is still largely unknown. This article gives a unique empirical account of the daily accountability pressures and the strategies that Members of Parliament (MPs) in Ghana employ in responding to the demands that they face. While literature on political clientelism focuses on explanatory factors like lack of political credibility, political machines capable of effective monitoring, autonomy of brokers, high levels… Expand
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