What Not to Multiply Without Necessity

  title={What Not to Multiply Without Necessity},
  author={Jonathan Schaffer},
  journal={Australasian Journal of Philosophy},
  pages={644 - 664}
  • J. Schaffer
  • Published 2 October 2015
  • Philosophy
  • Australasian Journal of Philosophy
The Razor commands us not to multiply entities without necessity. I argue for an alternative principle—The Laser—which commands us not to multiply fundamental entities without necessity. 

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