What Matters in Corporate Governance?

@article{Bebchuk2004WhatMI,
  title={What Matters in Corporate Governance?},
  author={Lucian Arye Bebchuk and Alma Cohen and Allen Ferrell},
  journal={Corporate Law: Securities Law},
  year={2004}
}
We investigate which provisions, among a set of twenty-four governance provisions followed by the Investor Responsibility Research Center (IRRC), are correlated with firm value and stockholder returns. Based on this analysis, we put forward an entrenchment index based on six provisions - four constitutional provisions that prevent a majority of shareholders from having their way (staggered boards, limits to shareholder bylaw amendments, supermajority requirements for mergers, and supermajority… Expand
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