What Is the Empirical Basis for Paying for Quality in Health Care?

  title={What Is the Empirical Basis for Paying for Quality in Health Care?},
  author={Meredith B Rosenthal and Richard G. Frank},
  journal={Medical Care Research and Review},
  pages={135 - 157}
  • M. Rosenthal, R. Frank
  • Published 1 April 2006
  • Medicine, Political Science
  • Medical Care Research and Review
Despite more than a decade of benchmarking and public reporting of quality problems in the health care sector, changes in medical practice have been slow to materialize. To accelerate quality improvement, many private and public payers have begun to offer financial incentives to physicians and hospitals based on their performance on clinical and service quality measures. The authors review the empirical literature on paying for quality in health care and comparable interventions in other… 
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