What Is Litigation in the World Trade Organization Worth?

  title={What Is Litigation in the World Trade Organization Worth?},
  author={Michael M. Bechtel and Thomas Sattler},
  journal={International Organization},
  pages={375 - 403}
Abstract Conventional wisdom holds that the creation of international, court-like institutions helps countries to peacefully settle trade conflicts, thereby enhancing overall welfare. Many have argued, however, that these institutions remain ultimately ineffective because they merely reflect the distribution of power in the anarchic international system. We argue that international litigation provides economic spillovers that create opportunities for judicial free-riding and explore empirically… 

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