What Is Knowledge?

  title={What Is Knowledge?},
  author={Linda Zagzebski},
  journal={Epistemic Values},
  • L. Zagzebski
  • Published 28 August 2017
  • Education
  • Epistemic Values
This chapter argues that problems in defining knowledge arise in part from the fact that the good of knowledge has been treated differently in different historical periods. In Plato and much of philosophy until the modern period, knowledge was treated as one of the supreme human goods, but the focus of contemporary philosophy on simple empirical knowledge led to a weakening of the normative component of knowledge. An account of knowledge should be the result of reflection on the broader… 

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The Analysis of False Judgement According to Being and Not-Being in Plato’sTheaetetus (188c10–189b9)

  • P. Crivelli
  • Philosophy
    Archiv für Geschichte der Philosophie
  • 2021
Abstract The version of the paradox of false judgement examined at Tht. 188c10–189b9 relies on the assumption that to judge falsehoods is to judge the things which are not. The presentation of the

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