What Happens When Coups Fail? The Problem of Identifying and Weakening the Enemy Within

  title={What Happens When Coups Fail? The Problem of Identifying and Weakening the Enemy Within},
  author={Josef Woldense},
  journal={Comparative Political Studies},
  pages={1236 - 1265}
  • Josef Woldense
  • Published 18 January 2022
  • Economics
  • Comparative Political Studies
The ruler’s ability to cope with crises is critical for authoritarian durability. Yet, the coping mechanism—the actual management strategies by which rulers confront crises—is largely treated as a black box. This study takes a step in addressing this problem by examining how rulers use their appointment powers to manage the crisis that is the aftermath of failed coups. I argue that the principle challenge of this period is that rulers cannot identify the opposition and to cope, they… 
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    British Journal of Political Science
  • 2019
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