What Does the Nation of China Think About Phenomenal States?

  title={What Does the Nation of China Think About Phenomenal States?},
  author={Bryce Huebner and Michael Bruno and Hagop Sarkissian},
  journal={Review of Philosophy and Psychology},
Critics of functionalism about the mind often rely on the intuition that collectivities cannot be conscious in motivating their positions. In this paper, we consider the merits of appealing to the intuition that there is nothing that it’s like to be a collectivity. We demonstrate that collective mentality is not an affront to commonsense, and we report evidence that demonstrates that the intuition that there is nothing that it’s like to be a collectivity is, to some extent, culturally specific… 

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  • Philosophy
    Wiley interdisciplinary reviews. Cognitive science
  • 2014
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    The Journal of analytical psychology
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