What Counts as Evidence for a Logical Theory?

  title={What Counts as Evidence for a Logical Theory?},
  author={Ole Thomassen Hjortland},
  journal={The Australasian Journal of Logic},
  • O. Hjortland
  • Published 18 November 2019
  • Philosophy
  • The Australasian Journal of Logic
Anti-exceptionalism about logic is the Quinean view that logical theories have no special epistemological status, in particular, they are not self-evident or justified a priori. Instead, logical theories are continuous with scientific theories, and knowledge about logic is as hard-earned as knowledge of physics, economics, and chemistry. Once we reject apriorism about logic, however, we need an alternative account of how logical theories are justified and revised. A number of authors have… 

A psychological theory of reasoning as logical evidence: a Piagetian perspective

Many contemporary logicians acknowledge a plurality of logical theories and accept that theory choice is in part motivated by logical evidence. However, just as there is no agreement on logical

The cost of closure: logical realism, anti-exceptionalism, and theoretical equivalence

Philosophers of science often assume that logically equivalent theories are theoretically equivalent. I argue that two theses, anti-exceptionalism about logic (which says, roughly, that logic is not

Intuitions, theory choice and the ameliorative character of logical theories

Anti-exceptionalists about logic claim that logical methodology is not different from scientific methodology when it comes to theory choice. Two anti-exceptionalist accounts of theory choice in logic

The Problem with ‘the Background Logic Problem’

Anti-exceptionalism is the view that logic is, among other things, responsive to a posteriori evidence. This brings three questions to the fore: i) what is evidence in logic? ii) how to determine

Logical abductivism and non-deductive inference

This paper discusses matters regarding the way of choosing the best theory of non-deductive inferences in deductive logic, and investigates the circularity involved in an abductive justification for a theory of abduction.

Logical theory revision through data underdetermination: an anti-exceptionalist exercise

  • Sanderson Molick
  • Philosophy
    Principia: an international journal of epistemology
  • 2021
It is argued that the ubiquitous nature of logical data is responsible for the proliferation of several distinct methodologies for logical theories and is coherent with the Laudanean view that agreement and disagreement between scientific theories take place at different levels.

Natural Language and Logical Consequence An Inferentialist Account

This thesis investigates the relationship between natural language and formal logic. It is usually thought that natural language and formal logic come apart at some point, which might stand in

Moderate anti-exceptionalism and earthborn logic

Though logical theories are established—and are liable to criticism—in a similar fashion as those of the sciences, and in this sense logic is not exceptional, to fulfill its mission logic must lay a claim to normative authority over the authors' argumentation and reasoning, which makes its methodology somewhat special.

Against telic monism in logic

Telic monism in logic is the thesis that there is one single philosophically primary goal to logic. A different way to put it is that there is only one canonical application to logic. This thesis is


The anti-exceptionalist debate brought into play the problem of what are the relevant data for logical theories and how such data affects the validities accepted by a logical theory. In the present



Anti-exceptionalism about logic

Logic isn’t special. Its theories are continuous with science; its method continuous with scientific method. Logic isn’t a priori, nor are its truths analytic truths. Logical theories are revisable,

Logic, Metalogic and Neutrality

The paper is a critique of the widespread conception of logic as a neutral arbiter between metaphysical theories, one that makes no `substantive’ claims of its own (David Kaplan and John Etchemendy

The Justification of the Basic Laws of Logic

This paper aims to answer the question of how beliefs in such attributions are justified, on both its descriptive and normative interpretations, and to make it plausible that beliefs formed this way really are justified.

Explosion and the normativity of logic

Logic has traditionally been construed as a normative discipline; it sets forth standards of correct reasoning. Explosion is a valid principle of classical logic. It states that an inconsistent set

Multiple Conclusions

I argue for the following four theses. (1) Denial is not to be analysed as the assertion of a negation. (2) Given the concepts of assertion and denial, we have the resources to analyse logical

In What Sense (If Any) Is Logic Normative for Thought

Logic is often said to provide norms for thought or reasoning. Indeed, this idea is central to the way in which logic has traditionally been defined as a discipline, and without it, it is not clear


Reasoning is just beginning to emerge as a central topic in its own right in analytic philosophy. One reason for this is the growing interest in the epistemology of inference. What justifies us in

Disagreement about logic

ABSTRACT What do we disagree about when we disagree about logic? On the face of it, classical and nonclassical logicians disagree about the laws of logic and the nature of logical properties. Yet,

Is logic empirical

The logical basis of metaphysics

Michael Dummett's new book is the greatly expanded and recently revised version of his distinguished William James Lectures, delivered in 1976, and shows how the choice between different logics arises at the level of the theory of meaning and depends upon the choice of one or another general form of meaning-theory.