Corpus ID: 220835128

Welfare-Preserving ε-BIC to BIC Transformation with Negligible Revenue Loss

  title={Welfare-Preserving $\epsilon$-BIC to BIC Transformation with Negligible Revenue Loss},
  author={Vincent Conitzer and Zhe Feng and David C. Parkes and Eric Sodomka},
In this paper, we provide a transform from an ε-BIC mechanism into an exactly BIC mechanism without any loss of social welfare and with additive and negligible revenue loss. This is the first ε-BIC to BIC transformation that preserves welfare and provides negligible revenue loss. The revenue loss bound is tight given the requirement to maintain social welfare. Previous ε-BIC to BIC transformations preserve social welfare but have no revenue guarantee (Bei and Huang, 2011), or suffer welfare… Expand
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