Welfare Guarantees in Schelling Segregation

@inproceedings{Bullinger2021WelfareGI,
  title={Welfare Guarantees in Schelling Segregation},
  author={Martin Bullinger and Warut Suksompong and Alexandros A. Voudouris},
  booktitle={AAAI},
  year={2021}
}
Schelling's model is an influential model that reveals how individual perceptions and incentives can lead to racial segregation. Inspired by a recent stream of work, we study welfare guarantees and complexity in this model with respect to several welfare measures. First, we show that while maximizing the social welfare is NP-hard, computing an assignment with approximately half of the maximum welfare can be done in polynomial time. We then consider Pareto optimality and introduce two new… Expand

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