Welfare Guarantees for Proportional Allocations

  title={Welfare Guarantees for Proportional Allocations},
  author={Ioannis Caragiannis and Alexandros A. Voudouris},
According to the proportional allocation mechanism from the network optimization literature, users compete for a divisible resource – such as bandwidth – by submitting bids. The mechanism allocates to each user a fraction of the resource that is proportional to her bid and collects an amount equal to her bid as payment. Since users act as utility-maximizers, this naturally defines a proportional allocation game. Syrgkanis and Tardos (STOC 2013) quantified the inefficiency of equilibria in this… CONTINUE READING
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