Weight of fitness deviation governs strict physical chaos in replicator dynamics.

  title={Weight of fitness deviation governs strict physical chaos in replicator dynamics.},
  author={Varun Pandit and Archan Mukhopadhyay and Sagar Chakraborty},
  volume={28 3},
Replicator equation-a paradigm equation in evolutionary game dynamics-mathematizes the frequency dependent selection of competing strategies vying to enhance their fitness (quantified by the average payoffs) with respect to the average fitnesses of the evolving population under consideration. In this paper, we deal with two discrete versions of the replicator equation employed to study evolution in a population where any two players' interaction is modelled by a two-strategy symmetric normal… Expand

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