Weaving Tangled Webs: Offense, Defense, and Deception in Cyberspace

  title={Weaving Tangled Webs: Offense, Defense, and Deception in Cyberspace},
  author={Erik Gartzke and Jon R. Lindsay},
  journal={Security Studies},
  pages={316 - 348}
It is widely believed that cyberspace is offense dominant because of technical characteristics that undermine deterrence and defense. This argument mistakes the ease of deception on the Internet for a categorical ease of attack. As intelligence agencies have long known, deception is a double-edged sword. Covert attackers must exercise restraint against complex targets in order to avoid compromises resulting in mission failure or retaliation. More importantly, defenders can also employ deceptive… 
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