Weaseling away the indispensability argument

  title={Weaseling away the indispensability argument},
  author={Joseph Melia},
According to the indispensability argument, the fact that we quantify over numbers, sets and functions in our best scientific theories gives us reason for believing that such objects exist. I examine a strategy to dispense with such quantification by simply replacing any given platonistic theory by the set of sentences in the nominalist vocabulary it logically entails. I argue that, as a strategy, this response fails: for there is no guarantee that the nominalist content of the platonistic… Expand
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Field’s programme: some interference
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Science Without Numbers: A Defence of Nominalism.
The description for this book, Science Without Numbers: The Defence of Nominalism, will be forthcoming.
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