Corpus ID: 49317238

Weak Mutual Majority Criterion for Voting Rules Aleksei

@inproceedings{Kondratev2018WeakMM,
  title={Weak Mutual Majority Criterion for Voting Rules Aleksei},
  author={Aleksei Y. Kondratev and Alexander S. Nesterov},
  year={2018}
}
We study a novel axiom for voting rules: the weak mutual majority criterion (WMM). A voting rule satisfies WMM if whenever some k candidates receive top k ranks from a qualified majority that consists of more than q = k/(k+1) of voters, the rule selects the winner among these k candidates. WMM lies between the two standard axioms: it is stronger than the majority criterion (here k = 1 and q = 1/2) and weaker than the mutual majority criterion (MM, here for any k the size of majority is fixed q… CONTINUE READING

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