Weak Condorcet winner(s) revisited

  title={Weak Condorcet winner(s) revisited},
  author={Dan S. Felsenthal and Nicolaus Tideman},
  journal={Public Choice},
A strong Condorcet winner (SCW) is an alternative, x, that a majority of voters rank higher than z, for every other alternative, z. A weak Condorcet winner (WCW) is an alternative, y, that no majority of voters rank below any other alternative, z, but is not a SCW. There has been some confusion in the voting/social choice literature as to whether particular voting rules that are SCW-consistent are also WCW-consistent. The purpose of this paper is to revisit this issue, clear up the confusion… Expand
5 Citations
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