• Corpus ID: 37267752

War, Transfers, and Political Bias ∗

  title={War, Transfers, and Political Bias ∗},
  author={Matthew O. Jackson and Massimo Morelli},
We examine the incentives for countries to go to war as they depend on the comparison of how much their pivotal decision-makers have at risk compared to how much they stand to gain from a war. How this ratio compares to the country at large is what we term “political bias”. If there is no political bias (a case that we loosely relate to a “pure democracy”), then there are always payments that one country would like to make to the other that will avoid a war. If there is a bias on the part of… 
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