Wage subsidies and hiring chances for the disabled: some causal evidence

  title={Wage subsidies and hiring chances for the disabled: some causal evidence},
  author={Stijn Baert},
  journal={The European Journal of Health Economics},
  • Stijn Baert
  • Published 2014
  • Economics, Medicine
  • The European Journal of Health Economics
  • This study evaluated the effectiveness of wage subsidies as a policy instrument to integrate disabled individuals into the labor market. To identify causal effects, a large-scale field experiment was conducted in Belgium. The results show that the likelihood of a disabled candidate receiving a positive response to a job application is not positively influenced by disclosing entitlement to the Flemish Supporting Subsidy. 
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