WHY NOT ALL EVIDENCE IS SCIENTIFIC EVIDENCE

@article{Santana2017WHYNA,
  title={WHY NOT ALL EVIDENCE IS SCIENTIFIC EVIDENCE},
  author={Carlos Santana},
  journal={Episteme},
  year={2017},
  volume={15},
  pages={209 - 227}
}
ABSTRACT Data which constitute satisfactory evidence in other contexts are sometimes not treated as valid evidence in the context of scientific confirmation. I give a justificatory explanation of this fact, appealing to the incentives, biases, and social situatedness of scientists. 
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