• Corpus ID: 454848

WHY DO PUBLIC FIRMS ISSUE PRIVATE AND PUBLIC EQUITY , CONVERTIBLES AND DEBT ?

@inproceedings{Gomes2005WHYDP,
  title={WHY DO PUBLIC FIRMS ISSUE PRIVATE AND PUBLIC EQUITY , CONVERTIBLES AND DEBT ?},
  author={By Armando Gomes and G. Phillips},
  year={2005}
}
We examine a comprehensive set of private and public security issuance decisions by publicly traded companies. We study private and public issues of debt, convertibles and common equity securities. The market for public firms issuing private securities is large. Of the over 13,000 issues we examine, more than half are in the private market. We find that asymmetric information and moral hazard problems play a large role in the public versus private market choice and the security type choice. Our… 

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