Voting systems and strategic manipulation: An experimental study

  title={Voting systems and strategic manipulation: An experimental study},
  author={Anna Bassi},
  journal={Journal of Theoretical Politics},
  pages={58 - 85}
  • Anna Bassi
  • Published 1 January 2015
  • Economics
  • Journal of Theoretical Politics
This article presents experiments that analyze the strategic behavior of voters under three voting systems: plurality rule, approval voting, and the Borda count. Applying a level-k reasoning model approach, strategic behavior is found to be significantly different under each treatment (voting system). Plurality rule leads voters to play in the most sophisticated (i.e. best response), but not necessarily insincere, manner. Thus, this voting system displays at the same time the highest incidence… 

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