Corpus ID: 692096

Voting procedures with incomplete preferences

@inproceedings{Konczak2005VotingPW,
  title={Voting procedures with incomplete preferences},
  author={Kathrin Konczak and J. Lang},
  year={2005}
}
  • Kathrin Konczak, J. Lang
  • Published 2005
  • Computer Science
  • We extend the application of a voting procedure (usually defined on complete preference relations over candidates) when the voters’ preferences consist of partial orders. We define possible (resp. necessary) winners for a given partial preference profile R with respect to a given voting procedure as the candidates being the winners in some (resp. all) of the complete extensions of R. We show that, although the computation of possible and necessary winners may be hard in general case, it is… CONTINUE READING
    233 Citations

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