Voting paradoxes and how to deal with them

  title={Voting paradoxes and how to deal with them},
  author={Hannu Nurmi},
Introduction.- Basic Concepts and Tools.- Alternatives and Opinions.- Preference Profile.- Pairwise Comparison and Tournament Matrix.- McGarvey's Theorem.- Paradoxes of the Enlightenment Era.- Borda's Paradox.- Condorcet's Paradox.- Borda and Condorcet Compared.- How Frequent Are the Paradoxes?.- The Geometry of Voting.- The Saari Triangles.- The Conditions of Paradoxes.- The Paradoxical Act of Voting.- The Cost Calculus.- The No-Show Paradox.- Monotonicity Paradoxes.- Additional Support… 

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  • H. Nurmi
  • Economics
    Group Decision and Negotiation
  • 2020
Voting paradoxes have played an important role in the theory of voting. They typically say very little about the circumstances in which they are particularly likely or unlikely to occur. They are

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