Voting in the Medieval Papacy and Religious Orders

  title={Voting in the Medieval Papacy and Religious Orders},
  author={Ian McLean and Haidee Lorrey and Josep M. Colomer},
We take institutions seriously as both a rational response to dilemmas in which agents found themselves and a frame to which later rational agents adapted their behaviour in turn. Medieval corporate bodies knew that they needed choice procedures. Although the social choice advances of ancient Greece and Rome were not rediscovered until the high middle ages, the rational design of choice institutions predated their rediscovery and took some new paths. Both Ramon Llull (ca 1232-1316) and Nicolaus… 

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