• Corpus ID: 119451007

Voting in the European Union: The square root system of Penrose and a critical point

@article{yczkowski2004VotingIT,
  title={Voting in the European Union: The square root system of Penrose and a critical point},
  author={Karol Życzkowski and Wojciech Słomczyński},
  journal={arXiv: Other Condensed Matter},
  year={2004}
}
The notion of the voting power is illustrated by examples of the systems of voting in the European Council according to the Treaty of Nice and the more recent proposition of the European Convent. We show that both systems are not representative, in a sense that citizens of different countries have not the same influence for the decision taken by the Council. We present a compromise solution based on the law of Penrose, which states that the weights for each country should be proportional to the… 

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