Voting in Combinatorial Domains


This chapter addresses preference aggregation and voting on domains which are the Cartesian product (or sometimes, a subset of the Cartesian product) of finite domain values, each corresponding to an issue, a variable, or an attribute. As seen in other chapters of this handbook, voting rules map a profile (usually, a collection of rankings, see Chapter 1… (More)
DOI: 10.1017/CBO9781107446984.010


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@inproceedings{Lang2016VotingIC, title={Voting in Combinatorial Domains}, author={J{\'e}r{\^o}me Lang and Lirong Xia}, booktitle={Handbook of Computational Social Choice}, year={2016} }