Voting for Voters: A Model of Electoral Evolution

@article{Barber2001VotingFV,
  title={Voting for Voters: A Model of Electoral Evolution},
  author={Salvador Barber{\`a} and Michael Maschler and Jonathan Shalev},
  journal={Games and Economic Behavior},
  year={2001},
  volume={37},
  pages={40-78}
}
1 The authors thank R. J. Aumann, C. d’Aspremont, D. Granot, S. Hart, and A. Perea for various comments and suggestions that helped improve this paper. 2 E-mail: sbarbera@cc.uab.es. This author gratefully acknowledges partial support from Spanish Ministry of Education DGICYT Grant PB-98-0870 and Comissionat per a Universitats i Recerca Grant SGR98-62. 3 E-mail: maschler@vms.huji.ac.il. This author gratefully acknowledges DGICYT, Spanish Ministry of Education, for Grant SAB95-0276 that enabled… CONTINUE READING

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