Voting Weights and Formateur Advantages in the Formation of Coalition Governments

  title={Voting Weights and Formateur Advantages in the Formation of Coalition Governments},
  author={Stephen Ansolabehere and Michael M. Ting},
We examine the relationship between parliamentary seats and cabinet posts in European governments between 1946 and 2001. Our speci ̄cation improves on past studies in two respects. First, it derives and uses the voting weights of the underlying coalition formation games. This reduces the measurement error introduced when seat shares are used to proxy for voting weights. Second, the statistical model allows us to nest the predictions of di®erent formal theories of the distribution of posts. We… CONTINUE READING

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