Voting Systems that Combine Approval and Preference

@inproceedings{Brams2006VotingST,
  title={Voting Systems that Combine Approval and Preference},
  author={Steven J. Brams},
  year={2006}
}
Information on the rankings and information on the approval of candidates in an election, though related, are fundamentally different—one cannot be derived from the other. Both kinds of information are important in the determination of social choices. We propose a way of combining them in two hybrid voting systems, preference approval voting (PAV) and fallback voting (FV), that satisfy several desirable properties, including monotonicity. Both systems may give different winners from standard… CONTINUE READING

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