Voting Paradoxes and Group Coherence

  title={Voting Paradoxes and Group Coherence},
  author={William V. Gehrlein and Dominique Lepelley},

Scoring Rules and Preference Restrictions: The Strong Borda Paradox Revisited

For a given voting situation, the Strong Borda Paradox occurs when a Condorcet loser exists and is elected. A Condorcet loser is a candidate that loses all his pairwise comparisons. In

Analyzing the Practical Relevance of the Condorcet Loser Paradox and the Agenda Contraction Paradox

A large part of the social choice literature studies voting paradoxes inwhich seemingly mild properties are violated by common voting rules. In this chapter, we investigate the likelihood of the

Exploring the No-Show Paradox for Condorcet Extensions Using Ehrhart Theory and Computer Simulations

This work analyzes the likelihood of the No-Show Paradox for six Condorcet extensions under various preference models using Ehrhart theory as well as extensive computer simulations and finds that, for few alternatives, the probability of the NSP is rather small, but as the number of alternatives increases, it becomes much more likely.

Draft – November 14 , 2018 Exploring the No-Show Paradox for Condorcet Extensions Using Ehrhart Theory and Computer Simulations

Results from voting theory are increasingly used when dealing with collective decision making in computational multiagent systems. An important and surprising phenomenon in voting theory is the

How frequently do different voting rules encounter voting paradoxes in three-candidate elections?

We estimate the frequencies with which ten voting anomalies (ties and nine voting paradoxes) occur under 14 voting rules, using a statistical model that simulates voting situations that follow the

On the probabilistic modeling of consistency for iterated positional election procedures

A well-known fact about positional election procedures is that its ranking of m alternatives can change when some of the alternatives are removed from consideration—even if the voters’ preferences

Reflections on Arrow’s theorem and voting rules

These reflections, written in honor of Kenneth Arrow, sketch out how one political scientist thinks about Arrow’s theorem and its implications for voting rules. The basic claim is that Arrow’s

The Likelihood of the Consistency of Collective Rankings Under Preferences Aggregation with Four Alternatives Using Scoring Rules: A General Formula and the Optimal Decision Rule

This paper provides a general formula for the limiting probability of the consistency of collective rankings when there are four competing alternatives given that the decision rule is a scoring rule and determines the optimal decision rules among the scoring rules that provide the best guarantee of consistency.

The Chamberlin-Courant Rule and the k-Scoring Rules: Agreement and Condorcet Committee Consistency

For committee or multiwinner elections, the Chamberlin-Courant rule (CCR), which combines the Borda rule and the proportional representation, aims to pick the most representative committee

An analytical and experimental comparison of maximal lottery schemes

It is proved that schemes are the only homogeneous $$ ML $$ ML schemes that satisfy $$ SD $$ SD -efficiency and $$ SD = SD -participation, but are also among the most manipulable $$ ML = ML schemes.