Voting Equilibria Under Proportional Representation

  title={Voting Equilibria Under Proportional Representation},
  author={Seok-ju Cho},
  journal={American Political Science Review},
  pages={281 - 296}
  • Seok-ju Cho
  • Published 28 April 2014
  • Economics
  • American Political Science Review
This article studies the consequences of strategic voting by outcome-oriented voters in elections under proportional representation (PR). I develop a model of elections under PR, in which voters choose among an arbitrary finite number of parties, and the policy outcome is determined in a postelection bargaining stage. I use a new solution concept, robust equilibrium, which greatly mitigates the well-known problem of indeterminate predictions in multicandidate competition. Applying the… 
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