Vote Buying or Turnout Buying? Machine Politics and the Secret Ballot

  title={Vote Buying or Turnout Buying? Machine Politics and the Secret Ballot},
  author={Simeon Nichter},
  journal={American Political Science Review},
  pages={19 - 31}
  • Simeon Nichter
  • Published 1 February 2008
  • Business
  • American Political Science Review
Scholars typically understand vote buying as offering particularistic benefits in exchange for vote choices. This depiction of vote buying presents a puzzle: with the secret ballot, what prevents individuals from accepting rewards and then voting as they wish? An alternative explanation, which I term “turnout buying,” suggests why parties might offer rewards even if they cannot monitor vote choices. By rewarding unmobilized supporters for showing up at the polls, parties can activate their… 
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