Vote-Buying and Reciprocity

  title={Vote-Buying and Reciprocity},
  author={Frederico Shimizu Finan and Laura Schechter},
  journal={IZA Institute of Labor Economics Discussion Paper Series},
  • F. Finan, L. Schechter
  • Published 1 September 2011
  • Business
  • IZA Institute of Labor Economics Discussion Paper Series
While vote-buying is common, little is known about how politicians determine who to target. We argue that vote-buying can be sustained by an internalized norm of reciprocity. Receiving money engenders feelings of obligation. Combining survey data on vote-buying with an experiment-based measure of reciprocity, we show that politicians target reciprocal individuals. Overall, our findings highlight the importance of social preferences in determining political behavior. 
Promises, Promises: Vote-Buying and the Electoral Mobilization Strategies of Non-Credible Politicians
Vote-buying is pervasive, but not everywhere. What explains significant variations across countries in the greater use of pre-electoral transfers to mobilize voters relative to the use of
Value for Money? Community Targeting in Vote-Buying and Politician Accountability
Community targeting of vote payments — defined as the saturation of entire neighborhoods with cash prior to elections — is widespread in the developing world. In this paper, we utilize laboratory
The Conditionality of Vote-Buying Norms: Experimental Evidence from Latin America
Anti-vote-buying campaigns led by NGOs and political elites denounce the practice as a crass economic transaction detrimental to democracy. Do potential clients stigmatize vote buying to the same
Diminishing the Effectiveness of Vote Buying: Experimental Evidence from a Persuasive Radio Campaign in India∗
During the 2014 Indian general elections, we carried out a large-scale randomized radio experiment to study how voters respond to information about the economic consequences of electing politicians
Social Networks and the Targeting of Vote Buying
  • Cesi Cruz
  • Business
    Comparative Political Studies
  • 2018
The social networks of voters have been shown to facilitate political cooperation and information transmission in established democracies. These same social networks, however, can also make it easier
The Effect of Holding Office on the Behavior of Politicians
It is found that holding office increases adherence to the norm of reciprocity, and causal effects of holding office on politicians' behavior are identified.
Brokering Votes with Information Spread Via Social Networks
Throughout much of the developing world, politicians rely on political brokers to buy votes prior to elections. We investigate how social networks help facilitate vote-buying exchanges by combining
Clientelism as Persuasion-Buying
In distributing clientelistic payoffs to citizens, the best strategy a party machine can pursue, we argue, is to target citizens who are opinion-leading epicenters in informal conversation networks.
Is Vote Buying Effective? Evidence from a Field Experiment in West Africa
Vote buying, i.e. cash for votes, happens frequently in many parts of the world. However, in the presence of secret ballots, there is no obvious way to enforce vote transactions. To infer effects of


Vote Buying: General Elections
We examine the consequences of vote buying, assuming this practice were allowed and free of stigma. Two parties compete in a binary election and may purchase votes in a sequential bidding game via
Attitude-dependent altruism, turnout and voting
This paper presents a goal-oriented model of political participation based on two psychological assumptions. The first is that people are more altruistic towards individuals that agree with them and
Vote Buying in Argentina
We analyze vote buying in Argentina—the payment by political parties of minor benefits (food, clothing, cash) to citizens in exchange for their votes. How widespread is vote buying in Argentina, and
Altruism and Turnout
  • J. Fowler
  • Economics
    The Journal of Politics
  • 2006
Scholars have recently reworked the traditional calculus of voting model by adding a term for benefits to others. Although the probability that a single vote affects the outcome of an election is
Vote Buying or Turnout Buying? Machine Politics and the Secret Ballot
Scholars typically understand vote buying as offering particularistic benefits in exchange for vote choices. This depiction of vote buying presents a puzzle: with the secret ballot, what prevents
Bribing Voters
We show how an outside party offering incentives to a committee can manipulate at no cost collective decisions made through voting. This contrasts with previous contributions--which ignore the
Trust, Reciprocity, and Social History
Abstract We designed an experiment to study trust and reciprocity in an investment setting. This design controls for alternative explanations of behavior including repeat game reputation effects,
Electoral Competition and Special Interest Politics
We study the competition between two political parties for seats in a parliament. The parliament will set two types of policies: ideological and non-ideological. The parties have fixed positions on
The Determinants of Success of Special Interests in Redistributive Politics
We examine what determines whether an interest group will receive favors in pork-barrel politics, using a model of majority voting with two competing parties. Each group's membership is heterogeneous
Electoral Politics as a Redistributive Game
Spatial models of electoral competition typically simplify the analysis by ignoring the question of internal constituency politics: constituencies are modeled simply as a distribution of ideal points